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Abstract. We discuss the collective behavior of a network of individuals that receive,
process and forward to each other tasks. Given costs they store those tasks in buffers,
choosing optimally the frequency at which to check and process the buffer. The
individual optimizing strategy of each node determines the aggregate behavior of
the network. We find that, under general assumptions, the whole system exhibits
coexistence of equilibria and hysteresis.
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1. Introduction
The study of the interaction between people processing tasks is at the base of the science
of social networks [1]. Recently the huge amounts of data coming from the analysis of
e-mail networks, web communities and social databases, have motivated the study of
statistical properties and related models of such human activities [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
A more complete analysis should take into account also the ‘costs’ associated to
the execution and storage of tasks, that transform any individual decision in a non-
trivial economic optimization problem. By costs we broadly intend any negative return
deriving from the process. In the case of execution it could be the effort and time spent,
in the case of storage it could be the risk that the information or the payoff conveyed by
the task become too old and hence useless. In such cases the problem would be that of
finding an optimal balance between those two different aspects. Human activity is thus
the result of a complex intertwined two-levels problem. On the one hand, there is the
individual problem of optimal timing (or optimal stopping [7]) encountered by rational
agents in many economic situations, and object of investigations in operations research
(as in optimal delivering [8]), finance (e.g. in the case of American options, see [9]), and
macroeconomics (e.g. optimal retirement, as in [10]). On the other hand, we have the
network queueing problem resulting from the interactions between individuals, deeply
studied in computer science [11] and recently in statistical physics as well [12, 13].
The general problem can be formulated in the following way. Let us consider a
network of rational agents sending each others different tasks to be executed. An agent
gets positive payoff from processing a given task, but faces also some fixed and variable
costs. For this reason the agents can store tasks in queues and decide the optimal time
intervals at which the queues are checked and processed. There is however a trade–off
in delaying task processing, because there is always the risk, waiting too long, that tasks
becomes too old to be worth being processed.
In principle, if tasks have different priorities (according to the models proposed
in the literature [3, 5, 6, 14, 15]), every agent should have different queues with
different costs, each one containing tasks with similar priority. The optimization problem
associated with each queue produces different processing times, and we expect that tasks’
heterogeneity would be reflected in the heterogeneity of processing times as observed in
real data [4, 16, 17, 18]. Whereas a complete understanding of task-completion processes
in human dynamics seems at present very challenging, a first step in this direction is
represented by understanding the relation between individual optimization problems
and the collective behavior.
In the present paper we study a version of this general model in which individuals on
a homogeneous network receive tasks from an external source and interact by processing
and forwarding each other those tasks. All tasks have the same priority and the
individual problem consists in computing the optimal processing rate that maximizes the
individual utility. Because of interaction, the individual strategies depend on the global
behavior of the system, producing interesting collective phenomena. We find analytically
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that, for some values of the parameters (i.e. external arrival rate of tasks, and costs),
there are two possible stable equilibria for the collective optimal strategies: one in which
nobody process tasks (trivial equilibrium), and one in which every individual process
tasks with the same non-zero rate. Depending on the nature of costs, the transition
between the two behaviors may not be continuous, and interesting hysteresis phenomena
can be observed.
Understanding the effects of costs on the individual strategy is far from being of
purely theoretical interest. Indeed, American e-mail providers AOL and Yahoo proposed
in February 2006 a taxation on e-mails in order to reduce the phenomenon of spamming.+
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we focus on the individual
behavior, characterizing the optimal responding strategy under the assumption of
Poisson statistics for the arriving tasks. We leave part of the detailed calculations,
for this and the following sections, to Appendix B. In Section 3 we discuss the network
process, and derive the stationary states under the assumption that single individuals
respond optimally. We assume, in order to obtain clear analytic results, that the network
is homogeneous of fixed degree. It is clear that the network structure will heavily depend
on the specific environment (e.g. even for e–mails networks alone, different datasets
have shown different topologies [19, 20]). Section 4 illustrates the main results about
the collective behavior of the model, depending on the external parameters. Section 5
generalizes to non–regular networks. Conclusions and plans for future research are left
to Section 6.
2. Individual behavior
In this section we focus on the optimization of individual response strategies when the
agents receive homogeneous tasks (e.g. e-mails, jobs,. . . ) to process and/or forward.
Tasks arrive from outside, in general both from an exogenous source and from other
agents, but we ignore this distinction for the moment. The only relevant assumption
on individual behavior is that the agents have limited knowledge of system’s dynamics,
thus they always perceive the arriving tasks as Poisson independent events. The arrival
rate λ is estimated monitoring the queue during the dynamics.
Arriving tasks are stored automatically in a queue (e.g. e-mail buffer), and the
agent gets payoffs from processing tasks in her queue. Each stored task has the same
positive payoff π > 0, but this payoff becomes 0 at a Poisson rate µ. Tasks with zero
payoff are nor executed neither forwarded.∗ Among the tasks which are stored in the
buffer, we will call survived those that maintain the positive payoff.
Another important ingredient of real human dynamics is that individuals are not
constantly monitoring their tasks list. For instance, people have to connect to the
+ See e.g. The New York Times from February 5 2006, online at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/technology/05AOL.html .
∗ If they are e–mails, the information they convey may become outdated. Generally, in the case of
jobs or other opportunities, it could suddenly become too late to process them.
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Internet in order to check their web-mail window, and employees that have constant
access to the web cannot spend their work-time constantly monitoring their mail-box.
Note that this cost can be arbitrarily small. Therefore, in our model an agent is not
constantly monitoring her buffer, and some fixed cost C > 0 is paid whenever the queue
is accessed. Let us suppose that, opening the buffer, an agent finds ℓ new-arrived tasks, a
non-negative cost c < π is associated to check each of them.♯ As anticipated, the agent
processes only the n tasks that still give a positive payoff π. Assuming a separable
utility function, the overall net payoff is nπ− ℓc. Note that in this model, an agent does
not execute the tasks bringing null utility; this could be formalized with an additional
positive cost κ for processing tasks. This cost would only re–scale π to π − κ, so that,
without loss of generality, we ignore this detail in the rest of the paper.
The individual optimization problem is the following: the agent has to choose a
Poisson rate ν at which to check her buffer (and consequently process it). Note that
the condition c < π prevents the trivial strategy, according to which it is always better
not to check. We normalize costs and payoffs, setting π ≡ 1, so that c and C are just
ratios, with the property that c < 1. Without loss of generality we also normalize the
time setting µ ≡ 1 so that our new λ will be actually the ratio λ
µ
, and similarly for ν.
The problem is to maximize the long run (τ → ∞) payoff per unit time, from the
present time onwards:
max
ν
{
lim
τ→∞
1
T (ν)
∫ τ+T (ν)
τ
U(ν, λ)
}
= max
ν
Eν,λ[U(ν, λ)]
Eν [T (ν)]
= max
ν
Eν,λ[n(ν, λ)− ℓ(ν, λ)c− C]
1/ν
.(1)
Eν [T (ν)] =
1
ν
is the expected time between two checks of the queue, while Eν,λ[ℓ(ν, λ)]
and Eν,λ[n(ν, λ)] are respectively the expected total arrived and survived tasks in the
buffer. All expectations are taken on the stochastic process with fixed λ, that is a
parameter at the individual level, and ν, the free quantity to tune the optimization
process. The optimization problem can also be derived from a Bellman equation, in the
limit where the discount rate goes to 1 (see Appendix A for details).
The optimization problem from Eq. 1 reduces (see Appendix B) to
max
ν
{
ν
(
λ
ν + 1
− cλ
ν
− C
)}
, (2)
where, moreover,
Eν,λ[ℓ] =
λ
ν
, (3)
and
Eν,λ[n] =
λ
ν + 1
. (4)
♯ The cost c can be thought as the cost of reading an e-mail or just checking if a job is still worth
being processed.
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Imposing the extremization in Eq. 2 leads to
λ
ν + 1
− λν
(ν + 1)2
− C = 0 . (5)
Setting µ = 1 and re–normalizing the other rates with respect to µ, the optimal
processing rate of the queue is
ν∗ =
√
λ
C
− 1 . (6)
The dependence on the costs c is restored by the condition that the optimal rate
of utility is not negative (since not answering at all would guarantee zero payoffs and
costs). Imposing U∗ ≥ 0,
U∗ =
λ
ν∗ + 1
− c λ
ν∗
− C
=
λ√
λ
C
− c λ√
λ
C
− 1
− C ≥ 0
=⇒ ν∗ ≥
√
c
1−√c , (7)
where
√
c
1−√c is always non negative for c ≤ 1. In summary, the two conditions that
ensure individual strategy’s optimization are
ν∗ =


√
λ
C
− 1 if
√
λ
C
− 1 ≥
√
c
1−√c
0 otherwise .
(8)
In general, one can safely assume the buffer capacity to be infinite, but for some
reasons that will be clear later, one can also be interested to the case in which the queue
length L is finite. The maximization problem (Eq. 2) is now (see Appendix B)
max
ν



1−
(
λ
λ+ ν
)L
(
λν
ν + 1
− cλ
)
− Cν

 . (9)
The problem in Eq. 9 has a unique solution which depends on both c and C. The
solution is however non–algebraic, even in the case c = 0.
3. Collective behavior
We consider now many agents located on the nodes of a network, with a given topological
structure. Individually, each agent behaves as discussed in the previous section, but now
individual λ’s depend on the collective behavior. For the sake of simplicity we consider
a homogeneous network, of fixed degree K, and assume that all agents behave similarly.
Each one of them receives tasks exogenously at a Poisson rate λ0 (also normalized with
respect to µ). When an agent processes a task contained in her buffer, this task is
forwarded to all neighbors with a constant and uniform probability p > 0. This is
the probability that a given task is forwarded to a specific neighbor or a probability of
successful transmission. In the framework of e-mail networks, it can be the probability
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that a friend is interested in the subject of a given e-mail. Under this scenario, an agent
receives tasks from outside (at a rate λ0) and from neighbors (at an unknown rate).
The overall rate λ is estimated by the agents themselves under the assumption that the
arrival events are Poissonian. This is a good assumption as far as p ≪ 1. Note that,
assuming homogeneity, λ is the same, in expectation, for all the nodes of the network.
The number of tasks ℓi arriving in the buffer of agent i is partly coming from her
Ni neighbors and partly from outside, in symbols
ℓi = ℓ0→i +
∑
j∈Ni
ℓj→i , (10)
and similarly the number of surviving tasks is
ni = n0→i +
∑
j∈Ni
nj→i . (11)
We will proceed in steps to study the stochastic processes associated to these variables.
The first step is that of deriving coupled equations for the generating functions of this
stochastic process on the network.
3.1. Generating functions approach to the stationary state
Since the process is based on the assumption that arrival events are Poisson distributed,
the generating functions formalism [21] turns out to be very useful to analyze the
stationary collective behavior of the system. Moreover, the procedure (detailed in
Appendix B) holds for any network structure under local tree approximation.
The overall generating function for the probability that i has received a certain
number of tasks ℓi (between two consecutive processing events) is defined by
E
[
sℓi
]
= Ξi(s) =
νi
νi + (1− s)λ0
∏
j∈Ni
νi
νi + [1−Ψj (1 + (s− 1)p)] νj . (12)
The overall generating function Ψi(s) for the number ni of tasks that are still active
when i process the buffer is instead
E [sni] = Ψi(s) =
νi + 1
νi + 1 + (1− s)λ0
∏
j∈Ni
νi
νi +
[
1−Ψj
(
1 + (s− 1)p νi
νi+1
)]
νj
.(13)
3.2. Stationary state of the regular network
Eq. 13 can be easily solved in a regular network of degree K. In this case, we expect
νi = νj for any i and j, and Eqs. 12, 13 become

Ξ(s) = ν
ν+(1−s)λ0
(
1
2−Ψ(1+(s−1)p)
)K
Ψ(s) = ν+1
ν+1+(1−s)λ0
(
1
2−Ψ[1+(s−1)p νν+1 ]ν
)K (14)
The expected values for ℓi and ni can be computed as the derivatives of generating
functions in s = 1. From Eq. 14 we get
E[n] = Ψ′(1) =
λ0
1 + (1− pK)ν . (15)
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From
Ξ′(1) =
λ0
ν
+ pKΨ′(1) (16)
we get
E[ℓ] = Ξ′(1) =
λ0(ν + 1)
ν(1 + (1− pK)ν) . (17)
In Eqs. 15 and 17 the relevant parameters are λ0, ν and the product pK, which
represents the expected number of forwarded tasks per processed one by a single node.
We will call it
m ≡ pK . (18)
Noting that the expected rate λ is actually νE[ℓ], we have that
λ =
λ0(ν + 1)
1 + (1−m)ν . (19)
Using Eq. 19 and the optimality relation ν =
√
λ
C
− 1, we obtain the condition
λ0
C
= (1−m)ν2 + (2−m)ν + 1 , (20)
from which the optimal processing rate ν can be determined.
3.3. Approach to the stationary state: stability under a learning process
Note that the condition in Eq. 20 determines the stationary state of the queueing process
on the network. Starting from a random initial condition, i.e. random distribution of
processing rates {νi}, the system should self-organize to reach some stationary state
satisfying the above relation. A realistic way to generate this self-organization is by
means of a learning process for the quantity λi for each node i of the system. Assume
that agents update their expectations about λi every time they process the buffer (times
are indexed by discrete t’s), using the linear rule
λi(t+ 1) = (1− ǫ)λi(t) + ǫ ℓi(t)
Ti(t)
, (21)
where ℓi(t) is the number of tasks arrived in i’s buffer, and Ti(t) is the actual time–lag
between t and t+ 1.
In expectations, Eq.21 becomes trivially
λi(t+ 1) = λi(t) + ǫ
(
νiE[ℓi]− λi(t)
)
. (22)
If we substitute ǫt′ = t, going at the limit ǫ→ 0 we obtain the dynamical equation
dλi
dt′
= νiEνi[ℓi]− λi(t′) , (23)
where νi =
√
λi
C
− 1 is a function of λi, and Eνi[ℓi] is given by Eq. 17.
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Imagine a small perturbation around the stationary value λ∗i , so that λi(t
′) =
λ∗i + δλi(t
′). Eq. 23 gives
dδλi
dt′
= λ∗i +
∂
∂νi
(νiEνi [ℓi])
∂νi
∂λi
δλi − λ∗i − δλi +O(δλ2i )
=
(
λ0m
[1 + (1−m)νi]2 ·
1
2
√
λiC
− 1
)
δλi +O(δλ
2
i ) . (24)
The system is stable if the term in the brackets is negative, i.e.
λ0m
[1 + (1−m)νi]2 ·
1
2
√
λiC
− 1 ≤ 0 , (25)
substituting with Eq. 19,
λ2im
λ0(νi + 1)2
· 1
2
√
λiC
≤ 1 . (26)
Finally, using Eq. 6, we get the stability condition
λ0
C
≥ m
2
νi +
m
2
. (27)
that is always satisfied under Eq. 20, when m ≤ 1. When instead m > 1, Eq. 20 is
a downward parabola and Eq. 27 is satisfied only as long as λ0
C
is increasing in νi (see
Section 4).
Note that, as we defined the learning process, agents update their beliefs only when
processing their buffer. This means in principle that they could assume E[λi] to be
actually smaller than λ0, because they don’t know λ0. In this case they could all play
the strategy νi = 0 and never update beliefs. The rate λ0 could be very high but agents
would never find out. To avoid similar paradoxical situations, in the following, we will
assume that agents know λ0 and also know that E[λi] ≥ λ0. In other terms, Eq.21
becomes
λi(t+ 1) = max
{
(1− ǫ)λi(t) + ǫℓi(t)
T (t)
, λ0
}
. (28)
As expected from the regularity of the network, in the stable case all the νis will converge
to the same ν given by Eq. 20.
The next section and Appendix C are devoted to a detailed analysis of the
stationary collective behavior of the system depending on the external parameters.
4. Results
The system’s stationary behavior depends on Eqs. 8 and 20, and on the stability analysis
of the learning process (Eq. 27). The overall scenario emerging from these equations is
very rich, since the collective behavior changes varying m = pK, λ0/C, and c. These
form the minimal set of independent external parameters of the model.
We analyze the different behaviors of the system studying the ‘phase diagram’ of
ν as a function of λ0/C, when the value of m is fixed with respect to c. As m varies,
there are 4 possible distinct cases. We treat here the two most illustrative ones, leaving
the remaining two to Appendix C.
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c1/2  / (1 − c1/2)
(1− m c1/2)  /  (1 − c1/2)2 1 / (1 − c1/2)2
0 λ0/C
ν
m<1
λ0 / C = (1−m) ν
2
 + (2−m)  ν  +1
λ0/C = (m/2) ν + (m/2)
Figure 1. When m = pK < 1 there is at least a stable solution for every value of λ0
C
,
but there are two in the illustrated interval.
4.1. Case m ≤ 1
When m ≤ 1, the number of tasks present in the system does not grow, the queue
lengths are bounded, and the dynamics always reach a well defined stationary state.
This is the most realistic scenario, illustrated in Fig. 1. The trivial state in which all
agents prefer not to process the tasks, ν = 0, is always a possible stable equilibrium
as long as λ0/C <
1
(1−√c)2 . Above this value, the trivial strategy is suboptimal for any
single individual even if adopted by all the others. Eq. 20 predicts the appearance of a
non trivial solution with ν > 0 for λ0/C ≥ 1, but the corresponding value of the utility
is non-negative only for λ0/C ≥ 1−m
√
c
(1−√c)2 . The stability condition for this solution (see
Eq. 27) is always satisfied.
From Figure 1, we see that an interval exists, where both solutions are possible
and stable. When λ0/C is in this interval, the system will converge to one of the two
possible equilibria depending on the initial conditions, and hysteresis-like phenomena
can be observed. Note that this co-existence of equilibria is not reflected at the level
of single instance: due to the hypothesis of network homogeneity, in a single realization
of the dynamics all agents (possibly with different initial conditions) converge to the
same state, with λ given by Eq. 19. The variable cost c does not affect the shape of the
functions describing the two possible equilibria, but it affects their region of admissibility
and the interval of co-existence. This interval shrinks to zero in λ0/C = 1, at the limit
c→ 0. As c grows this interval is right–shifted and its size grows.
These solutions have been verified numerically using continuous time simulations.
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4.2. Case m > 2
1+
√
c
c1/2 / (1 − c1/2)
m > 2 / (1+c1/2)
ν
λ0 / C = (1−m) ν
2
 + (2−m)  ν  +1
0 λ0 / C
(unstable)
1 / (1 − c1/2)2
λ0 / C = (m/2) ν + (m/2)
Figure 2. When m = pK > 2
1+
√
c
the only stable solution is the trivial one, for
λ0
C
≤ 1
(1−
√
c)2
.
In this case, the non–trivial solution ν > 0 is always unstable, as shown in Fig. 2
obtained combining Eq. 20 with the conditions imposed by Eqs. 8 and 27. The trivial
solution ν = 0 exists as long as λ0
C
≤ 1
(1−√c)2 . Above this value, no stationary solution is
expected. The variables λ and ν, as well as the buffer’s length, will explode to infinity for
all nodes, since the generation rate λ0 will be higher than the deletion rate (due to p, K
and the ν’s). Since m > 1, this can happen also for λ0
C
≤ 1
(1−√c)2 , if the initial processing
rates are sufficiently high. In this case one can speak about congestion of the system.
One possibility to avoid congestion is to put a bound L < ∞ to the buffers’ length:
tasks arriving when the buffer is full are neglected. The corresponding optimization
problem (Eq. 9) can be solved numerically, even if the optimal value of ν for L≫ 1 will
not differ considerably from the previously considered one. Imposing the bound L <∞
in the learning process, we get
λi(t+ 1) = (1− ǫ)λi(t) + ǫmin{ℓi(t), L}
Ti(t)
. (29)
Now, implementing this learning process in simulations, we find an additional stationary
solution at a large value νˆ, which is independent on the value of the parameter λ0
C
(and
also on the learning parameter ǫ, necessary for the simulations).
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5. Non–homogeneous networks
It is possible to derive the behavior of the system also in a non–homogeneous network.
Here we restrict to some considerations that generalize previous sections. Assuming
that the structure of the network is uncorrelated, Eq. 13 for a k-degree node becomes
Ψk(s) =
νk + 1
νk + 1 + (1− s)λ0

∑
k′
k′P (k′)
〈k〉
νk
νk +
[
1−Ψk′
(
1 + (s− 1)pk νkνk+1
)]
νk′


k
, (30)
where P (k) is the degree distribution and 〈k〉 is the average connectivity. We also
generalize to a pk that depends on the degree k of the sender node. We can compute
E[nk] = Ψ
′
k(1) =
λ0
νk + 1
+ k
pk
νk + 1
∑
k′
k′P (k′)
〈k〉 νk′Ψ
′
k′(1) , (31)
from which, calling Θ ≡ ∑k′ k′P (k′)〈k〉 νk′Ψ′k′(1), and using Eqs. 3 and 4, we obtain
λk = λ0 + kpkΘ . (32)
The rate λk at which a node of degree k receives tasks is linear in k. By Eq. 8, giving
the optimal νk, and using again Eqs. 3 and 4, we have
Θ =
∑
kpk>d(Θ)
kP (k)
〈k〉 (λ0 + kpkΘ)
(
1−
√
C
λ0 + kpkΘ
)
≡ F (Θ) , (33)
where
d(Θ) = max


C
(1−√c)2 − λ0
Θ
, 0

 (34)
indicates the minimum kpk for which it is profitable to check the buffer (i.e. νk = 0 for
kpk ≤ d(Θ)).
We are looking for the fixed points of F (Θ), which are steady states of the system.
The behavior is qualitatively the same as in the regular case. We can distinguish two
cases depending on the parameter
m ≡ 〈k
2pk〉
〈k〉 , (35)
which generalizes the m defined in previous sections.
In the case m > 1, since F (Θ) ≃ mΘ, for Θ ≫ 1, one fixed point diverges to
infinity, indicating a congested state. For λ0 <
C
(1−√c)2 there is another fixed point in
Θ = 0, which correspond to the trivial solution νk = 0 for any k. We are not excluding in
principle other fixed points (Appendix C shows how this applies to the regular network
case).
Let us now address the case m ≤ 1. When λ0 ≥ C(1−√c)2 , since d(Θ) = 0, it is easy
to see that F (0) > 0, F ′(Θ) ≥ 0 and F ′′(Θ) ≥ 0 for any Θ ≥ 0. There will be a unique
non–trivial fixed point Θ∗ in which all the nodes have a positive processing rate νk, for
any degree k.
Finally, for m ≤ 1 and λ0 < C(1−√c)2 , one fixed point is the trivial one Θ = 0. This is
the generalization of the admissible interval of the trivial strategy in the regular network
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case (see Fig. 1). There could be other fixed points and hysteresis phenomena, as those
described in Section 4.1, depending on the specification of the network structure (P (k))
or of the agents behavior (pk).
6. Conclusion
Human task-completion dynamics can be formulated as a non-trivial economic
optimization problem, in which individuals optimize their strategies of interaction with
the rest of the system. We have studied a simple model of optimal queueing in a network
of identical agents that receive tasks, store them in queues and process them following
a well defined optimal strategy.
The simplicity of the model allows to understand the different roles played by
fixed and variable costs (C and c respectively) in the strategy optimization, and more
generally it unveils the collective optimal behavior. Fixed costs C are associated with the
action of controlling the state of the queue and processing the tasks, while variable costs
c are associated to every received task. This can be interpreted as a way of introducing
a cost function that is monotonously increasing with the number of task to process.
It is simple to find examples in realistic situations. For instance, in e–mail networks,
individuals do not check their mail–boxes all the time as it has a cost in terms of wasted
time; hence they decide to check it at a certain rate that they consider optimal.
We have shown that varying fixed costs does not change the type of transition
from the not responding equilibrium to the dynamical steady states, but the position
of the transition itself (fixing λ0, individuals are favored to respond as C decreases).
The dependence on the variable costs is instead more surprising: when variable costs
are absent, the transition is continuous, whereas for c > 0 a discontinuity is developed
that introduces a non-trivial hysteresis phenomenon in the collective behavior of the
processing rate ν.
This model is a first step towards the understanding of the effects of individual
optimization processes in collective human dynamics. Its simplicity allows to obtain
several analytical results and a complete theoretical insight in the problem. There are
many possible extensions of the model, it could be possible to introduce a multiple-queue
system with some priority principle, as proposed in Ref. [22] for a similar problem.
Another possibility could be to consider heterogeneous networks of agents, pushing
forward the analysis of Section 5. As discussed there, we expect the general behavior
of an uncorrelated network to qualitatively resemble the regular network case. It would
be interesting to go beyond random networks, including e.g. degree correlation, and to
study the network structure that realizes the best compromise between stability of the
system, average utility and minimization of lost information. We leave this analysis for
future investigations.
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Appendix A. Bellman equation
As in dynamic programming we compute the optimal strategy ν∗ using the recursive
Bellman equation for the value function V with given initial condition ν0 and with
time-discount rate δ = e−β, i.e.
V ∗β (ν0, λ) = maxν
{
Eν,λ
[(
1− e−β
)
U(ν, λ) + e−βT0V ∗β (ν1, λ)
]}
, (A.1)
where T0 is the time at which the queue is processed for the first time, the constant factor
1 − e−β is applied to every utility outcome (its role will be clarified in the following)
and Eν,λ[·] is the average value of a quantity over the distribution of the arrival and
processing Poisson processes. As the process is assumed to be stationary, Tj = T for all
j and the equation simplifies to
V ∗β (ν;λ) = maxν


(
1− e−β
)
Eν,λ [U(ν;λ)]
1− Eν [e−βT (ν)]

 , (A.2)
The factor 1− e−β allows to take the limit β → 0 of the Bellman equation keeping the
value function measurable and giving the same weight to all future events. In this limit,
the optimization problem reduces to Eq. 1.
Appendix B. Details of the analytic derivation
Appendix B.1. Derivation of Eq. 2
In order to derive an expression for the optimal processing rate (that is also the response
rate) of an individual, we have to compute the expectations in Eq. 1. The probability
that the queue contains ℓ tasks when it is observed is
Pν,λ(ℓ) =
∫ ∞
0
(λt)ℓe−λt
a!
νe−νtdt =
(
λ
λ+ ν
)ℓ
ν
λ+ ν
, (B.1)
from which the expectation value
Eν,λ[ℓ] =
∞∑
ℓ=0
ℓPν,λ(ℓ) =
λ
ν
. (B.2)
The conditional probability that only n tasks survive (i.e. have non-zero payoff when
the queue is checked) out of the ℓ arrived ones reads
Pν,λ,µ(n|ℓ) =
(
ℓ
n
)(
λ
ν + µ
)n (
µ
ν + µ
)ℓ−n
. (B.3)
Remember that, without loss of generality, we assume µ = 1 (and the relative
normalization of ν and λ). We obtain the expectation value of n(ν, λ),
Eν,λ[n] =
∞∑
ℓ=0
Pν,λ(ℓ)
ℓ∑
n=0
nPν,λ(n|ℓ)
=
∞∑
ℓ=0
(
λ
λ + ν
)ℓ
ν
λ+ ν
ℓ∑
n=0
n
(
ℓ
n
)(
λ
ν + 1
)n (
1
ν + 1
)a−n
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=
∞∑
ℓ=0
(
λ
λ + ν
)ℓ
ν
λ+ ν
· ℓν
ν + 1
=
ν
ν + 1
· λ
ν
=
λ
ν + 1
. (B.4)
The optimization problem from Eq. 1 reduces to
max
ν
{
ν
(
λ
ν + 1
− cλ
ν
− C
)}
. (B.5)
Appendix B.2. Derivation of Eq. 9
Eq. 1 is correct for ℓ < L, but now Pν,λ(ℓ) = 0 for every ℓ > L, hence
Pν,λ(L) = 1−
L−1∑
ℓ=0
Pν,λ(ℓ) .
The expected value of ℓ is computed in the same spirit of Eq. B.2, but differently,
Eν,λ[ℓ] =
L−1∑
ℓ=0
ℓPν,λ(ℓ) + L
(
1−
L−1∑
ℓ=0
Pν,λ(ℓ)
)
=
λ
ν

1−
(
λ
λ+ ν
)L . (B.6)
Similarly Eq. B.4 becomes
Eν,λ[n] =
λ
ν + 1

1−
(
λ
λ+ ν
)L , (B.7)
and the maximization problem (Eq. 2) is now
max
ν



1−
(
λ
λ+ ν
)L( λν
ν + 1
− cλ
)
− Cν

 . (B.8)
Appendix B.3. Derivation of Eqs. 12 and 13
The number of tasks arrived at node i from outside the system between two successive
accesses to the queue has distribution
P (ℓ0→i = k) =
(
λ0
λ0 + νi
)k
νi
λ0 + νi
, (B.9)
and the corresponding generating function reads
ψ0→i(s) =
∞∑
k=0
skP (ℓ0→i = k) =
νi
νi + (1− s)λ0 . (B.10)
We have called νi the optimal processing rate of the queue at node i. The probability
distribution of the number of tasks with non-zero payoff is
P (n0→i = k) =
∞∑
a=0
P (a)P (k|a) = 1 + νi
λ0 + νi + 1
(
λ0
λ0 + νi + 1
)k
, (B.11)
and the corresponding generating function is
φ0→i(s) =
νi + 1
νi + 1 + (1− s)λ0 . (B.12)
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The same computations for ℓj→i and nj→i are more complicated. Starting from the
relation
ℓj→i =
mj∑
h=0
ℓ
(h)
j→i (B.13)
we first have to compute the probability that j discharges mj times her buffer before i
discharges her own, i.e.
P (mj = k) =
(
νj
νi + νj
)k
νi
νi + νj
. (B.14)
The generating function of this process is
ξj→i(z) =
∞∑
k=0
(
νj
νi + νj
)k
νi
νi + νj
zk =
νi
νi + (1− z)νj . (B.15)
In each of these discharges the number of tasks forwarded to i has distribution
P (ℓ
(h)
j→i = k) =
∞∑
n=k
Pj(n)
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k , (B.16)
where Pj(n) is the probability that j finds n still active tasks when checking (i.e. with
positive payoffs). The generating function for P (ℓ
(h)
j→i) can be expressed in terms of the
generating function for Pj(n),
Φj→i(s) =
∞∑
k=0
P (ℓ
(h)
j→i = k)s
k =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
n=k
Pj(n)
(
n
k
)
(ps)k(1− p)n−k
=
∞∑
n=k
∞∑
k=0
Pj(n)
(
n
k
)
(ps)k(1− p)n−k =
∞∑
n=k
Pj(n) (1 + (s− 1)p)n
≡ Ψj (1 + (s− 1)p) , (B.17)
so that Ψj is the generating function of j’s buffer length.
Putting things together, the generating function for the distribution of the number
of tasks that i receives from j is
ξj→i (Φj→i(s)) =
νi
νi + [1−Ψj (1 + (s− 1)p)] νj . (B.18)
Recalling Eqs. 10 and B.10, the overall generating function for the probability that i
has received a certain number of tasks ℓi (between two consecutive processing events)
is defined by
Ξi(s) = ψ0→i(s)
∏
j∈Ni
ξj→i (Φj→i(s))
=
νi
νi + (1− s)λ0
∏
j∈Ni
νi
νi + [1−Ψj (1 + (s− 1)p)] νj . (B.19)
One can repeat the whole procedure of Eqs. B.14–B.18, from Eq. B.12, to obtain
the overall generating function Ψi(s) for the number ni of tasks that are still active
when i process the buffer,
Ψi(s) =
νi + 1
νi + 1 + (1− s)λ0
∏
j∈Ni
νi
νi +
[
1−Ψj
(
1 + (s− 1)p νi
νi+1
)]
νj
.(B.20)
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Appendix C. Other results
We continue here, from Section 4, the study of the phase diagram of ν as a function
of λ0/C, as m varies with respect to c. When m > 1, congestion is always a possible
outcome of the system, but it may coexist with stable non–trivial steady states, as long
as m ≤ 2
1+
√
c
. Since c < 1 there is an interval for m that characterize two possibilities,
analyzed in this Appendix.
Let us start by defining m′ ≡ 21−
√
2
√
c−c
(1−√c)2 . Note that, for c ∈ (0, 1), we always have
1 < m′ < 2
1+
√
c
.
Case 1 < m < m′
c1/2 / (1 − c1/2)
1 < m < m’
ν
λ0 / C = (1−m) ν
2
 + (2−m)  ν  +1
(1− m c1/2) / (1 − c1/2)2
0
m2 / 4(m−1) λ0 / C
(2−m) / 2(m−1)
unstable
stable
1 / (1 − c1/2)2
λ0 / C = (m/2) ν + (m/2)
Figure C1. When m = pK > 1 there are no stable solution for 1
(1−
√
c)2
, but there
are two in the illustrated interval.
When m > 1 the parabola determined by Eq. 20 is leftward. We have shown that,
when m > 2
1+
√
c
> 1, the only stable solution is the trivial one (ν = 0), as long as
λ0
C
< 1
(1−√c)2 . The case m ∈ (1, m′), illustrated in Fig. C1, is more interesting. The
stability condition (Eq. 27), intersects Eq. 20 at the vertex of the parabola, so that the
upper branch of the solution is always unstable. This point is given by λ0
C
= m
2
4(m−1) and
ν = 2−m
2(m−1) . Note that when m > 1, then
m < m′ ⇒ m
2
4(m− 1) <
1
(1−√c)2 . (C.1)
If 1−m
√
c
(1−√c)2 <
λ0
c
< m
2
4(m−1) there is another stable solution (see Fig. C1) which lies on
the parabola. There is an interval with two stable non–intersecting equilibria, but one
of them is valid only inside this interval, while the other is on a proper (at both sides)
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overset of it. We assume not to observe any phenomenon of hysteresis, since agents will
keep adopting the trivial strategy, no matter how we vary the parameter λ0
c
across the
interval
[
1−m√c
(1−√c)2 ,
m2
4(m−1)
]
.
Case m′ ≤ m ≤ 2
1+
√
c
If m′ ≤ m ≤ 2
1+
√
c
, then Eq. C.1 is not satisfied and there is hysteresis, as for
the case m ≤ 1. For λ0
C
< 1
(1−√c)2 the trivial solution is the only stable one. For
λ0
C
∈
[
1
(1−√c)2 ,
1−m√c
(1−√c)2
]
we have two stable equilibria (the trivial and the non–trivial
one). Finally, for λ0
C
> 1−m
√
c
(1−√c)2 , only the non–trivial one is possible, up to
λ0
C
= m
2
4(m−1) .
Cases m = m′ and m = 2
1+
√
c
represent the same situation at the limit of zero measures.
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